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Abstract
Everyday, we are bombarded with periodic, exogenous appeals and instructions on how to
behave. How do these appeals and instructions affect subsequent coordination? Using
experimental methods, we investigate how a one-time exogenous instruction affects subse-
quent coordination among individuals in a lab. Participants play a minimum effort game
repeated 5 times under fixed matching with a one-time behavioral instruction in either the
first or second round. Since coordination behavior may vary across countries, we run experi-
ments in Denmark, Spain and Ghana, and map cross-country rankings in coordination with
known national measures of fractualization, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orienta-
tion. Our results show that exogenous interventions increase subsequent coordination, with
earlier interventions yielding better coordination than later interventions. We also find that
cross-country rankings in coordination map with published national measures of fractualiza-
tion, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation.
Introduction
Everyday, we are bombarded with periodic, exogenous appeals and instructions on how to
behave. We are reminded to vaccinate our children and keep them away from daycare and
school when they are sick, we are told what behavior is acceptable when utilizing shared
office facilities (e.g., cleaning up after yourself when you use the office kitchen), and we are
instructed how to keep our neighborhoods clean (e.g., no littering, staying off the grass, and
picking up after your dog). These information campaigns and reminders of expected conduct
are important, insofar as they serve as coordination devices, especially when, at the most basic
level, individuals are unable to coordinate well [1–3].
An explanation for coordination failure could be that individuals have diffused prior beliefs
regarding the coordination outcome. In a standard minimum effort game, an individual’s
effort choice is highly dependent on the effort choice he expects from his group members.
Given his expectations, an individual will first act on his home-grown beliefs about what is
appropriate and then update these beliefs as he observes and interacts with others. Hence, any
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information or experience that affects his expectations will affect his behavior. We conjecture
that exogenous appeals and instructions on how to behave, similar to those mentioned above,
do just that.
In this paper, we experimentally investigate how exogenous appeals and instructions
(henceforth, exogenous interventions) affect an individual’s subsequent coordination behav-
ior. In a between subjects design with fixed matching, we have participants play the standard
minimum effort game for 5 rounds. In one treatment, which we call the R1Int Treatment, par-
ticipants are told, after first round instructions, that they MUST pick the Pareto dominant
effort level for that round. In another treatment, which we call the R2Int Treatment, partici-
pants are told, after the second round instructions, that they MUST pick the Pareto dominant
effort level for that round. We compare post-intervention coordination behavior of individuals
in our treatments with those who were not told to pick an effort level (NoInt Treatment).
We run separate experiments among a group of Danes, a group of Spaniards, and a group
of Ghanaians. We do this for several reasons. First, general experimental literature shows
that there may be considerable cross-country variation in individual behavior in terms of
cooperation, coordination and learning [4–10]. Our experimental design aims to document
these differences and offer some observable correlations in the discussion. Second, in the
more specific experimental literature on coordination, only one paper—to our knowledge—
has looked at cross-country effects. In this paper Engelmann and Normann [9] compare
their experiments in Denmark with similar experiments on students run by others. Their
results show that Danes are able to coordinate better than non-Danes. From their own exper-
iments, they also find that when Danes are in a group with non-Danes, the proportion of
Danes in the group can be used to predict how well-coordinated the group will be. However,
since the experiments were run by different researchers and used for different research ques-
tions, cross-country differences in the behavior of Danes and non-Danes in Engelmann and
Norman [9] may possibly be confounded by experimental differences. Our design provides a
cleaner way of studying cross-country differences. Lastly, while previous experimental results
using a Danish sample drove our decision to run experiments in Denmark, our choice of
Spain and Ghana were largely driven by the desire to exploit as much cross-country variation
while keeping the time zones—and hence, the experiment times—across countries constant.
Our desire to minimize as much cross-country variation as possible led to our choice of par-
ticipants (university students), solicitation method (pen-and-paper), instructor nationality
(all locals but all trained together in Denmark), experimental money to real money exchange
rates (purchasing power parity converted and relative to the country’s minimum wage), and
of course, time and season (experiments were simultaneously run in spring). Running simul-
taneous experiments in Denmark, Spain and Ghana was also made easier by the fact that
logistics in these countries had already been set for other experiments that required partici-
pant interaction across countries.
We note that although there is literature claiming that students behave similarly to the gen-
eral population [11–13], we do not claim our student population to be representative of the
population in different countries. They do, however, share history and culture with the rest of
their populations. With that caution in mind, we note that ethnic, linguistic and religious frac-
tualization measures published by Alesina, et al. [14] are highest in Ghana and higher in Spain
than in Denmark. These imply that Danes are more homogeneous, and hence, possibly better
at coordinating than Ghanaians and Spaniards.
Geert Hostede measures of uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation may also be
correlated with coordination behavior [15]. On one hand, “uncertainty avoidance” measures
the extent to which individuals of a culture feel threatened by unknown situations; and
hence, can proxy for our participants’ level of ambiguity aversion. We expect individuals
Effects of exogenous interventions on coordination
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from countries with high uncertainty avoidance to coordinate closer to the risk dominant
equilibrium. Our reason for this is as follows: individuals who are ambiguity averse will be
averse to what in the literature is called social uncertainty (also referred to as strategic uncer-
tainty), the uncertainty that arises because a participant is unsure of what other individuals
in his or her group will choose [16, 17]. Hence, an ambiguity averse participant will pick lev-
els closer to the risk dominant equilibrium as these levels insure him from losses associated
with picking a level higher than the minimum choice in the group. On the other hand, “long-
term orientation” measures how each society maintains its link to the past while dealing with
present and future challenges. Countries that score low are those that are very traditional,
whose citizens are likely to hold on to past grudges and more likely to view societal change
with suspicion. Long-term orientation measures, then, can proxy for how likely an interven-
tion will affect a participant’s subsequent behavior. Interventions can be viewed as a new way
of doing something. Participants who have high long-term orientation measures are more
likely to be open to the experience derived from the intervention and hence, more likely to
have better post-intervention coordination experiences. Among our three countries, Spain
has the highest uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation measure, Denmark has the
lowest uncertainty avoidance measure, while Ghana has the lowest long-term orientation
measure.
Our results show that, indeed, under a no intervention baseline, Danes are able to coordi-
nate better than Spaniards and Ghanaians. While initial coordination in Spain and Ghana are
similar, we find that the level at which Spaniards coordinate decline faster than the level at
which Ghanaians coordinate, leading us to conjecture that our Spanish participants are more
ambiguity averse. These results are correlated with measures of fractualization and uncertainty
avoidance.
We also find that although individuals are not required to comply with the exogenous inter-
vention, all individuals actually do comply. Hence, all individuals experience how it is when
they are able to coordinate at the highest possible level. A round after the intervention, coordi-
nation in all 3 countries continue to be higher than baseline, but only when the intervention
happens in the first round. Two and three rounds after a first-round intervention, coordina-
tion among Spaniards and Danes continue to be higher than baseline. When intervention
happens in the second round, Spaniards coordinate better than baseline a round after the
intervention, but not two and three rounds after. The same result, however, does not hold for
Danes and Ghanaians. An intervention in the second round does not lead to changes in the
coordination behavior among Danes and Ghanaians. We suggest that these results could be
driven by differences in long-term orientation. Greater openness to the intervention experi-
ence, i.e. high long-term orientation, leads to more effective intervention results.
Related literature
There is extensive experimental literature on coordination games, many of which investigate
how better coordination among individuals can be achieved. A review of several articles on
coordination games since 1992 reveals that coordination among individuals increase with
communication, repetition, smaller group sizes, lower risk, and the observability of other peo-
ple’s actions [18]. On top of this, many authors have also found that financial incentives [19–
21], gradually increasing the upper bound of a coordination game [22], the number of males
in a group [23], positive spillovers [24], and truth-telling oaths [25] increase coordination. In
terms of financial incentives, Fehr and Tyran [26] find that real payoffs yield better coordina-
tion than nominal payoffs. There is also discussion on whether non-monetary sanctions and
rewards are just as effective in fostering coordination as financial incentives [21, 27].
Effects of exogenous interventions on coordination
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What is perhaps more relevant and closely tied to our study is the effect of information,
advice and recommendations on coordination behavior. Information affects individual expec-
tations which, in turn, affect individual choices [2]. Revealing each player’s individual strategy
as opposed to just revealing the group’s minimum choice, for example, has been found to
increase coordination [28, 29]. Being given information regarding the play of a group member
who picks the Pareto dominant equilibrium also increases coordination [30]. In another ver-
sion of a coordination game called the dying seminar, Semeshenko et al. [31] examine what
happens to coordination when information is progressively decreased. They find that knowing
the actual number of participants in the previous round is enough for participants to coordi-
nate at the Pareto optimal equilibrium.
The effect of advice and recommendations on coordination behavior is very similar to the
effect of information. In fact, an additional piece of advice or recommendation can be consid-
ered an additional information given to experiment participants. But while information in the
context above comes from within (i.e., providing participants with knowledge on how coordi-
nated their group is and what the other members of the group decided on in the previous
round), advice and recommendations can come from a third party and may not necessarily be
about the group and its members. Chaudhuri et al. [32] investigate the effect of an advice in a
non-overlapping generations coordination game and find that coordination among partici-
pants is better when advice is made public and distributed in a way that makes it common
knowledge. Making recommendations common knowledge for all members of the group is
also a key ingredient for recommendations to successfully resolve coordination failure in a
coordination game with fixed matching [21].
The role of information, advice and recommendations has also been looked at outside the
coordination literature. Many have looked at the effect of peer information on pro-social
behavior as a way to increase contributions to public goods provision [33–37], conservation
[38–41] and charitable giving [42–45]. There are also those who have looked at the role of
intergenerational advice on public goods provision [46, 47], trust and generosity [48] and
resource extraction [49]. These papers find that positive information or advice increases pro-
social behavior while negative information or advice deters it.
Although we draw insights from the literature outside coordination, our paper is primarily
about coordination and as such, contributes to the existing knowledge on how better coordi-
nation can be achieved. In particular, we investigate, in three different countries, how an exog-
enous intervention that recommends a particular behavior can positively lead to better future
coordination. We conjecture that this kind of positive intervention can update an individual’s
posterior expectations of others’ behavior and change their subsequent coordination behavior,
with the magnitude of the effect differing across countries.
To a certain extent, our intervention can be thought of as a top-down establishment of a
social norm. Our intervention creates a focal solution to a coordination problem and hence
reduces the risk of coordination [50]. Moreover, since our intervention is costless and enforce-
ment is non-existent, our intervention can also be thought of as a way of nudging individuals
towards the Pareto dominant equilibrium [51]. However, our results show that although sub-
sequent coordination is higher after an intervention, subsequent declines in coordination
suggest that the intervention has failed to become a social norm. Our intervention is also too
paternalistic to truly be considered a nudge.
Given these, our contribution to the coordination literature is two-fold. First, to our knowl-
edge, our paper is the first to study how a one-time exogenous intervention in the form of a
behavioral instruction affects subsequent coordination. Our paper, to our knowledge, is also
the first to explore how basic coordination and post-intervention coordination differ across
countries.
Effects of exogenous interventions on coordination
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Materials and methods
A total of 60 experiment sessions (20 session in each country) were conducted in Denmark,
Spain and Ghana from April to May 2016. Participants in Denmark and Spain were recruited
using ORSEE [52] while participants in Ghana were recruited using flyers and in-class adver-
tisements. As in Denmark and Spain, participants in Ghana were randomly invited to experi-
mental sessions and as such, could not self-select into treatments. Most of our participants
were students at the University of Copenhagen, Pompeu Fabra University, and University of
Ghana, where the experiments were conducted. (Two individuals in Denmark, six individuals
in Spain, and three individuals in Ghana were no longer students at the time of our experi-
ment. All these individuals had already obtained their undergraduate degrees.) All were
national citizens of the country they were taking the experiment in.
In accordance with Danish legislation, our study did not require an institutional review
board (IRB), as sensitive data, as defined by the Danish Protection Agency, was not retrieved
from participants. Participants signed a consent form and were advised that they were free to
leave at any time during the experiment. A copy of the participant consent form in English
can be found in the supplementary information (S1 File). Participants also signed a payment
form when they received payment for the experiment. The complete dataset, without any iden-
tifying information regarding our participants, has been posted in FigShare (DOI 10.6084/m9.
figshare.5178229).
Instructors and experimenters were trained in Denmark prior to the experiments. All
instructors were nationals of the country they instructed experiments in, and only the instruc-
tors interacted with experiment participants during the experiment. The only time experi-
menters interacted with participants was when the latter received their payments, after having
completed the experiment.
All of our sessions had 12 participants each, except for 2 sessions in Denmark and 2 sessions
in Spain that only had 8 participants. One of these two sessions in Denmark and a different
session in Spain had to be dropped from our observations due to experimental error. (The
experimenter told everyone to pick the number 4 during a baseline session. We dropped this
session from our data.) Hence, we had a total of 684 participants: 220 participants from Den-
mark, 224 participants from Spain, and 240 participants from Ghana.
Instructions were given using the country’s academic language of instruction: Danish in
Denmark, Spanish in Spain and English in Ghana. They were initially written in English,
translated to Danish and Spanish by native speakers and re-translated to English by a different
set of native speakers [53]. This is to ensure that words and sentences are translated well and
that participants are not primed or framed in any way. We pay particular attention to the
translation of the word “must”. It is translated to Danish as “skal” and to Spanish as “debe”.
Re-translation successfully translated it back to “must”. English instructions from the experi-
ment in Ghana can be found in the supplementary information (S1 File). Spanish and Danish
instructions are available upon request.
Average earnings were 147.65 DKK, 12.84 EUR and 10.09 GHS, and sessions ran for 40
minutes on average. The minimum hourly wage in Denmark, Spain and Ghana are estimated
to be 110 DKK, 6 EUR and 7 GHS, respectively. All sessions were conducted using pen and
paper due to power outages and unreliable internet connections in Ghana. Participants
were unable to see other participants’ decision sheets: they were either assigned a table with
partitions or were seated at least two seats apart. Communication among participants was
disallowed during the experiment. All participants were asked for their consent, and once
everyone consented to participating in the experiment, were randomly and anonymously
assigned to groups of 4. They remained in the same group for the duration of the experiment
Effects of exogenous interventions on coordination
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and the identities of their group members were never revealed. Instructions were read out
loud and participants were asked to answer a few questions to test their understanding of the
instructions.
All participants participated in a standard minimum effort game for 5 rounds. They were
asked to choose an integer between 1 and 7, inclusive of 1 and 7, and were told that their pay-
offs depended on their chosen number and the minimum number chosen by all the members
of their group. The game has 7 Nash equilibria, where all individuals in the group choose the
same effort level. Everyone choosing 7 is the Pareto dominant equilibrium while everyone
choosing 1 is the risk dominant equilibrium. Fig 1 shows the payoff table that we used in the
experiment. It is standard to the literature and is exactly the same payoff table used in Van
Huyck, et al. [2], Cooper, et al. [54], and Engelmann and Normann [9].
Sessions differed in whether participants were told to pick the the Pareto dominant effort
level, i.e., pick “7”, in the first round (R1Int), in the second round (R2Int) or not told at all
(NoInt). During the round where participants were asked to pick “7”, they were free to deviate
from what was asked of them. There was no punishment for deviating. A summary of our
experimental design and the number of observations per treatment is found in Table 1.
Results
Most of our participants were university students in business, sciences, social sciences, humani-
ties and liberal arts. All of them were above 18 years of age. On average, Spanish participants
were younger than Ghanaian participants, and Ghanaian participants, in turn, were younger
than Danish participants. A majority of our participants in Ghana, almost half of our participants
Fig 1. Payoff table for the minimum effort game.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187840.g001
Effects of exogenous interventions on coordination
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in Denmark, and less than half of our participants in Spain were males. Denmark had the most
number of participants who were married and who have at least 1 child. A summary of these
demographic characteristics is included in the supplementary information (S1 Appendix).
While we see dissimilar gender proportions across countries, gender proportions across
treatments within each country are statistically similar. We also find that, within each country,
the age of participants are similarly distributed. The same holds true for civil status and num-
ber of children. A summary of these statistically tests is included in the supplementary infor-
mation (S2 Appendix). These support the fundamental assumption that participants within
each country are drawn from the same population of university students, and allow us to com-
pare participant choices across treatments. That is, along with the facts that (1) treatments
were assigned to sessions such that participants cannot select into treatments and (2) we have
a sufficiently large sample size, we can attribute the behavior of participants in each treatment
to treatment differences and not to individual differences.
In the following subsections, we first examine cross-country differences in coordination
before looking at the effects of a first-round and a second-round intervention on subsequent
coordination. We then compare between interventions and examine whether one intervention
yields better subsequent coordination results than the other. We present results from regres-
sions in this paper. Similar results can be obtained using one-tailed t-tests. Results from the
one-tailed t-tests can be found in the supplementary information (S3 Appendix). For conve-
nience, we label all rounds after an exogenous intervention as “PostRound”. That is, in R1Int,
round 2 is labeled PostRound1, round 3 is labeled PostRound2, etc. Similarly, in R2Int, round
3 is labeled PostRound1, round 4 is labeled PostRound2, etc. Since participants under NoInt
are not asked to pick “7” in any of their rounds, round 1 is the same as PostRound1, round 2 is
the same as PostRound2, etc.
Baseline coordination results
Looking at average contributions under NoInt, we find our results consistent with what has
been found in the literature. The less ethnically, linguistically and religiously fractualized
Table 1. Summary of experimental design.
Denmark
Code Treatment Name # Participants # Ind. Groups
NoInt No Intervention 72 18
R1Int Intervention in Round 1 80 20
R2Int Intervention in Round 2 72 18
Spain
Code Treatment Name # Participants # Ind. Groups
NoInt No Intervention 72 18
R1Int Intervention in Round 1 76 19
R2Int Intervention in Round 2 72 18
Ghana
Code Treatment Name # Participants # Ind. Groups
NoInt No Intervention 84 21
R1Int Intervention in Round 1 84 21
R2Int Intervention in Round 2 72 18
Notes: Two sessions in Denmark and Spain were dropped due to an experiment error. These sessions belonged to “NoInt”. 1 session in Denmark and 2
sessions in Spain only had 2 groups of 4. All three sessions belonged to “R1Int”. The rest of our sessions had 3 groups of 4.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187840.t001
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Danes are able to coordinate better than their more fractualized counterparts in Spain and
Ghana. On average, Spaniards and Ghanaians choose effort levels between 3 and 5 while
Danes choose effort levels between 5 and 6. As for how well Danes, Spaniards and Ghanaians
are able to coordinate with one another, the top part of Fig 2 shows that Danes are better able
to coordinate at higher levels than Spaniards and Ghanaians. Regression results in columns 1
and 5 of Table 2 show that Danes coordinate better than Ghanaians, increasing Danish profits
from coordination by 14.60 tokens.
Columns 1 and 5 of Table 2 also show that although Spaniards coordinate at levels lower
than Ghanaians, this does not translate to lower Spanish profits. In fact, when we look at
columns 3 and 7 of Table 2, we find that although the level at which Spaniards coordinate
decreases the longer they are in the game, Spanish profits from coordination are increasing.
The reason for these two seemingly contradictory results is this: Spaniards are able to coordi-
nate better but at lower levels. Looking at Fig 3, we see an increasing number of Spaniards
picking the lowest effort level starting from round 3.
We conjecture that the rapid decline in the level at which Spaniards coordinate is due to
Spaniards being more risk-averse than Ghanaians and Danes. While Spaniards initially coordi-
nated at levels similar to Ghanaians, miscoordination drove Spaniards to rapidly decrease
their coordination level towards the risk-dominant equilibrium. This result is in line with the
fact that Spaniards have higher measures of uncertainty avoidance than Ghanaians. Looking at
coordination in the fourth and fifth rounds, we find that Spaniards are unable to recover from
this decline.
Result 1 Danes are able to coordinate at higher levels than Spaniards or Ghanaians. The level
at which Spaniards coordinate declines more rapidly than the level at which Danes or Ghanaians
coordinate.
Intervened coordination results
Despite there being no enforcement and monitoring, all participants picked as instructed dur-
ing the intervention round. When the intervention happens in the first round, Danes, Span-
iards and Ghanaians coordinate at much higher levels the round right after the intervention
compared to a similar round under NoInt. In particular, Danes coordinate at an average level
of 5.5 (median group coordination: 5) in PostRound1 of R1Int compared to 4.17 (median
group coordination: 4) in PostRound1 of NoInt, Spaniards coordinate at an average level of
4.85 (median group coordination: 4) in PostRound1 of R1Int compared to 2.36 (median group
coordination: 2) in PostRound1 of NoInt, and Ghanaians coordinate at an average level of 4.36
(median group coordination: 3) in PostRound1 of R1Int compared to 3.19 (median group
coordination: 3) in PostRound1 of NoInt. Regression results on tokens earned (see Table 3)
and minimum choice in group (see Table 4) show statistically significantly higher coordination
and profits from coordination in all three countries. Coordination profits, after a first-round
intervention, in PostRound1 increases in Denmark by 20-23 tokens, in Spain by 30 tokens,
and in Ghana by 17-19 tokens.
Notably for Denmark and Spain, it is not just the round right after that is positively
affected by a first-round intervention. The effect of the intervention in Denmark continues
to be positive and statistically significant in PostRound2, not just when compared to Post-
Round1 of NoInt but also when compared to PostRound2 of NoInt (Wald Test: Column
(2) of Table 3, p = 0.0040; Column (2) of Table 4, p = 0.0110). Unfortunately, in Denmark,
PostRound3 under R1Int is no longer statistically significantly different from PostRound3
under NoInt (Wald Test: Column (2) of Table 3, p = 0.1180; Column (2) of Table 4,
p = 0.3160).
Effects of exogenous interventions on coordination
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Fig 2. Distribution of minimum group choices. The radii of the circles are calculated based on the percentage of groups with a particular minimum
effort level over the total number of groups per country and treatment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187840.g002
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We find a first-round intervention to have a much stronger effect on Spaniards than either
Danes or Ghanaians. Columns (3) and (4) of Tables 3 and 4 show positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficients for PostRound2 and PostRound3 under R1Int. Comparing this to the
NoInt coefficients, we find R1Int coefficients to be statistically significantly greater than the
NoInt coefficients (Wald Test: PostRound2 Column (3) of Table 3, p = 0.0053; PostRound2
Column (4) of Table 4, p = 0.0041; PostRound3 Column (3) of Table 3, p = 0.0039; PostRound3
Column (4) of Table 4, p = 0.0012). Hence, we have the following results:
Result 2 An exogenous intervention in the first round increases Danish coordination in the
succeeding two rounds, Spanish coordination in the succeeding three rounds, and Ghanaian coor-
dination in the first succeeding round.
When an intervention occurs in the second round, we see an increase in coordination and
level of coordination among Spaniards but not among Danes and Ghanaians. Tables 3 and 4
Table 2. Baseline coordination results.
Dependent Variable: Tokens Earned Minimum Choice in Group
All Denmark Spain Ghana All Denmark Spain Ghana
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Denmark 14.6032**
(6.3812)
1.0695*
(0.5760)
Spain -4.1468
(4.6340)
-0.9435**
(0.4526)
PostRound2 3.4722
(3.7319)
1.9444
(2.0683)
1.0714
(5.6239)
0.0608
(0.1826)
0
(0.1343)
0.0506
(0.3871)
PostRound3 5.8333
(5.8379)
9.1667*
(4.6791)
-0.5952
(4.4799)
0.0002
(0.2998)
-0.5443**
(0.2544)
-0.2004
(0.3421)
PostRound4 8.3333
(7.0642)
10.6944**
(4.7178)
2.0238
(4.4655)
0.0181
(0.4399)
-0.5705**
(0.2685)
-0.2138
(0.3847)
PostRound5 9.1667
(7.4512)
11.9444**
(5.0753)
1.1905
(5.1030)
-0.0345
(0.5128)
-0.7300**
(0.3686)
-0.273
(0.4151)
Constant 76.4524***
(3.4542)
85.6944***
(7.0078)
65.5556***
(6.5626)
75.7143***
(4.8231)
Constant_Cut1 -1.0180***
(0.2645)
-1.3768**
(0.5613)
-0.2845
(0.5056)
-1.8464***
(0.5541)
Constant_Cut2 -0.5958**
(0.2717)
-1.0592**
(0.4728)
-0.1024
(0.4966)
-0.9946**
(0.4533)
Constant_Cut3 0.0915
(0.2574)
-0.8368*
(0.4277)
0.2803
(0.4942)
0.2892
(0.3567)
Constant_Cut4 1.2630***
(0.2815)
0.1913
(0.3874)
2.1364**
(0.8446)
1.2731***
(0.3820)
Constant_Cut5 2.1784***
(0.2831)
0.7573**
(0.3847)
3.4546***
(1.0148)
3.1144***
(0.5539)
Constant_Cut6 3.4213***
(0.4041)
1.8839***
(0.4281)
R2/PseudoR2 0.09 0.01 0.04 0 0.05 0 0.01 0
N 1140 360 360 420 1140 360 360 420
Notes: OLS run for columns (1) to (4) and ordered logit run for columns (5) to (8). Denmark and Spain are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if a
participant is Dane or Spaniard, respectively. PostRound2, PostRound3, PostRound4, and PostRound5 are PostRound dummies that take on the value of 1
if an observation comes from a particular PostRound. Standard errors clustered on a group level in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.10.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187840.t002
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Fig 3. Distribution of participant choices. The radii of the circles are calculated based on the percentage of participants choosing a particular effort level
over the total number of participants per country-treatment. The total number of participants per country-treatment is available in Table 1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187840.g003
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show that a second round intervention increases Spanish amount of tokens earned by 21
tokens as a result of increasing the log odds that Spaniards coordinate at a higher level by 1–2.
We also see statistically significant coefficients when we regress tokens earned on PostRounds
2 and 3 under R2Int. These coefficients, however, are not statistically significantly different
from the coefficients of PostRounds 2 and 3 under NoInt (Wald Test: PostRound2 Column (2)
of Table 3, p = 0.1061; PostRound2 Column (2) of Table 4, p = 0.1480; PostRound3 Column
(2) of Table 3, p = 0.3906; PostRound3 Column (2) of Table 4, p = 0.0806). Hence, we have the
following results for R1Int:
Result 3 An exogenous intervention in the second round increases the level at which Spaniards
coordinate in the succeeding round. The same intervention, however, does not affect coordination
among Danes and Ghanaians.
Table 3. Intervention results on tokens earned.
Dependent Variable: Tokens Earned
Denmark Spain Ghana
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NoInt * PostRound2 3.4722
(3.6610)
3.4722
(3.6751)
1.9444
(2.0296)
1.9718
(2.0571)
1.0714
(5.5391)
0.9756
(5.6256)
NoInt * PostRound3 5.8333
(5.7270)
5.8333
(5.7490)
9.1667
*(4.5915)
9.2958
*(4.6572)
-0.5952
(4.4124)
-0.4878
(4.5201)
R1Int * PostRound1 20.4306**
(7.7103)
22.3500***
(7.3630)
30.2339***
(8.2914)
30.3262***
(8.3763)
17.3810**
(7.4870)
18.8069**
(7.4924)
R1Int * PostRound2 19.5556**
(8.5678)
21.4750***
(7.9168)
25.4971***
(8.0650)
25.7928***
(8.1947)
5.7143
(6.4556)
5.8955
(6.5472)
R1Int * PostRound3 12.6806
(9.3897)
14.6
(8.9417)
28.7865***
(8.4064)
28.9928***
(8.5372)
7.5
(6.1778)
8.174
(6.2162)
R2Int * PostRound1 2.2222
(10.8535)
3.8449
(10.1507)
21.2500**
(8.1464)
21.5328**
(8.1047)
1.9246
(6.9007)
2.5144
(6.9662)
R2Int * PostRound2 1.9444
(10.2975)
3.8449
(9.7744)
14.4444*
(7.7413)
14.7272*
(7.7380)
5.2579
(7.1705)
6.485
(7.4083)
R2Int * PostRound3 10.2778
(9.5476)
12.0139
(9.2397)
14.7222*
(7.7307)
15.0050*
(7.7596)
2.0635
(6.3791)
2.9556
(6.4481)
Gender 6.6292**
(3.2837)
-0.0983
(2.7668)
2.8093
(3.0460)
Age -0.9780**
(0.4333)
0.4821
(0.3070)
-0.5993
(0.8516)
Uncooperative -0.8936
(1.6255)
1.4481
(1.1713)
1.1061
(1.2625)
Trust 0.0243
(1.7785)
-0.3198
(1.2972)
-0.6393
(1.1010)
Risk 2.1008*
(1.0488)
0.0641
(0.7090)
0.3097
(0.6309)
Constant 85.6944***
(6.8747)
92.7504***
(16.3276)
65.5556***
(6.4397)
51.5023***
(10.6120)
75.7143***
(4.7503)
84.3420***
(21.9536)
R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.06
N 672 669 660 654 720 687
Notes: OLS regressions run. NoInt, R1Int and R2Int are dummies that take on the value of 1 if an observation belongs to NoInt, R1Int or R2Int, respectively.
PostRound1, PostRound2 and PostRound3 are PostRound dummies. All variables with “*” are interaction terms. Gender is 1 when a participant is male.
The rest of the variables are treated as continuous. Standard errors clustered on a group level in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.10.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187840.t003
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Table 4. Intervention results on coordination.
Dependent Variable: Minimum Choice in Group
Denmark Spain Ghana
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NoInt * PostRound2 0.0508
(0.2054)
0.0392
(0.2155)
0
(0.1314)
0.0191
(0.1311)
0.052
(0.3838)
0.0458
(0.3869)
NoInt * PostRound3 0.0395
(0.3622)
0.0635
(0.3695)
-0.5589**
(0.2593)
-0.5536**
(0.2651)
-0.2228
(0.3287)
-0.2232
(0.3347)
R1Int * PostRound1 1.1573**
(0.4847)
1.3710***
(0.4726)
2.6093***
(0.6919)
2.6059***
(0.7082)
1.5678***
(0.5839)
1.6275***
(0.5856)
R1Int * PostRound2 1.1965**
(0.5273)
1.3923***
(0.5186)
1.9966***
(0.6583)
1.9821***
(0.6783)
0.4294
(0.5283)
0.4405
(0.5351)
R1Int * PostRound3 0.8809
(0.5634)
1.0406*
(0.5433)
1.8860**
(0.7398)
1.8586**
(0.7571)
0.2953
(0.5267)
0.3593
(0.5192)
R2Int * PostRound1 0.3773
(0.6315)
0.4745
(0.6262)
1.8254**
(0.7279)
1.8452**
(0.7241)
-0.1616
(0.5587)
-0.1411
(0.5621)
R2Int * PostRound2 0.1067
(0.6386)
0.2381
(0.6604)
0.9521
(0.6325)
0.9646
(0.6403)
0.0582
(0.6109)
0.1037
(0.6387)
R2Int * PostRound3 0.3717
(0.6664)
0.5121
(0.6783)
0.5641
(0.6316)
0.5545
(0.6432)
-0.1415
(0.5612)
-0.1404
(0.5794)
Gender 0.5560**
(0.2190)
0.1644
(0.2433)
0.1841
(0.2832)
Age -0.0596**
(0.0297)
0.0418
(0.0342)
-0.0832
(0.0632)
Uncooperative -0.0386
(0.1179)
0.077
(0.1116)
-0.0279
(0.0978)
Trust 0.0165
(0.1155)
0.0609
(0.1222)
-0.0106
(0.0888)
Risk 0.1724**
(0.0685)
0.0759
(0.0618)
-0.0027
(0.0498)
Constant_Cut1 -1.4794***
(0.4903)
-1.5201
(1.0151)
-0.3342
(0.4891)
1.4229
(1.0503)
-2.1983***
(0.5353)
-4.0421**
(1.7549)
Constant_Cut2 -1.1461***
(0.4419)
-1.1648
(0.9886)
-0.1427
(0.4983)
1.6177
(1.0371)
-0.9202**
(0.3925)
-2.8041*
(1.6176)
Constant_Cut3 -0.8681**
(0.4073)
-0.8696
(0.9795)
0.3025
(0.4910)
2.0707**
(1.0320)
0.2925
(0.3646)
-1.5798
(1.6243)
Constant_Cut4 -0.0624
(0.4123)
-0.0306
(0.9944)
2.2961***
(0.5696)
4.0822***
(1.0838)
1.3328***
(0.3877)
-0.5466
(1.6598)
Constant_Cut5 0.9981**
(0.4208)
1.0671
(1.0076)
3.5842***
(0.6329)
5.3624***
(1.1296)
2.7326***
(0.4384)
0.8814
(1.7184)
Constant_Cut6 2.3800***
(0.4911)
2.5078**
(1.0475)
4.1966***
(0.6252)
5.9852***
(1.1575)
3.7436***
(0.5267)
1.9035
(1.7382)
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.03
N 672 669 660 654 720 687
Notes: Ordered logit regressions run. NoInt, R1Int and R2Int are dummies that take on the value of 1 if an observation belongs to NoInt, R1Int or R2Int,
respectively. PostRound1, PostRound2 and PostRound3 are PostRound dummies. All variables with “*” are interaction terms. Gender is 1 when a
participant is male. The rest of the variables are treated as continuous. Standard errors clustered on a group level in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.10.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187840.t004
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Looking at Results 2 and 3, we can conjecture that a first-round intervention has a different
effect on subsequent coordination than a second-round intervention. Wald tests between
R1Int and R2Int coefficients in Denmark reveal that PostRound1 coordination under R1Int is
higher than PostRound1 coordination under R2Int (Column (2) of Table 4, p = 0.0355). Dan-
ish PostRound2 coordination under R1Int is also higher than Danish PostRound2 coordina-
tion under R2Int (Column (2) of Table 4, p = 0.0405). In Spain, we find that PostRound1
under R1Int is not statistically significantly higher than PostRound1 under R2Int (Wald Test:
Column (4) of Table 4, p = 0.2170), but PostRound2 and PostRound3 under R1Int is statisti-
cally significantly higher than PostRound2 and PostRound3, respectively, under R2Int (Wald
Test: PostRound2 Column (4) of Table 4, p = 0.0626; PostRound3 Column (4) of Table 4,
p = 0.0528). In Ghana, we find PostRound1 under R1Int to be statistically significantly higher
than PostRound1 under R2Int (Wald Test: Column (6) of Table 4, p = 0.0095). Hence, we have
the following result:
Result 4 A first-round exogenous intervention leads to better coordination for Danes, Span-
iards and Ghanaians than a second-round exogenous intervention.
Discussions and conclusions
We explore how an exogenous intervention affects subsequent individual coordination behav-
ior. The intervention instructs participants in a laboratory experiment to pick the Pareto opti-
mal equilibrium in either the first or second round of a 5-round minimum effort game. We
compare individual behavior under these treatments with behavior under a no-intervention
baseline. To explore cross-cultural differences in coordination behavior, we undertook identi-
cal experiments in Denmark, Spain and Ghana.
We find considerable cross-country variation in coordination behavior with and without
intervention across our three countries. Without intervention, we find that Danish students,
who belong to a more ethnically, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous population than
Spanish and Ghanaian students, to be more coordinated than our Spanish and Ghanaian stu-
dents. This is in line with the perceived similarity hypothesis in the behavioral psychology litera-
ture. Individuals who perceive themselves to be more similar are better coordinated [55, 56].
We also find that individuals from countries with higher uncertainty avoidance are more likely
to pick lower levels. With almost double the level of uncertainty avoidance measure of Danes,
none of our Spanish and Ghanaian participants are able to coordinate at the highest possible
effort level in the first round. Many play it safe, coordinating at mid-levels of 3 or 4. As for the
subsequent round, we find that the measure for long-term orientation to be correlated with
coordination behavior. Spaniards, who have high measures of long-term orientation, are more
affected by a positive intervention in the previous round. We see this in the positive increases
in coordination after either a first-round or a second-round intervention.
We stress that while we may find cultural measures to correlate in an observable way with
coordination behavior, it is important to note that our study shares a limitation with many
cross-country studies, namely: the vast number of potential reasons for such cross-country
variation makes us unable to draw any meaningful causal conclusions.
We do not claim our sample to be representative of the Danish, Spanish and Ghanaian
population; and hence, we cannot generalize across the Danish, Spanish and Ghanaian popu-
lation. The choice to use student samples over representative samples is something we have
deliberated at length. The reasons for our choice of participant are as follows. First, since
participants in all three countries are students, it is easier to compare baseline coordination
behavior across countries since we’re holding educational attainment, profession, and
age (to a certain extent at least) constant. Second, like a Danish, Spanish and Ghanaian
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representative sample, students are products of the society and culture they belong to.
Hence, our measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractualization, uncertainty avoidance
and long-term orientation to describe homogeneity, ambiguity aversion and openness to
interventions are descriptive of our student sample. Lastly, when we look at the effects of
intervention or when we compare effects across interventions, we do this within (as opposed
to across) countries. As such, although our student sample is not representative, it is not the
level at which they coordinate that we are interested in but the difference in coordination
with and without intervention.
The novelty of our study is to document that an exogenous intervention that instructs indi-
viduals to coordinate at the Pareto optimum do indeed influence individual coordination
behavior in the subsequent rounds. We find that this is true in all countries when the interven-
tion is done in the first round. It is also true in Spain when the intervention is done in the
second round. Coordination decreases the further away the round is from the experience. Nev-
ertheless, Spaniards and Danes are able to coordinate better two and three rounds after a first-
round intervention compared to a no-intervention baseline.
The observation that an intervention in the first round leaves a longer lasting mark on the
behavior of individuals than an intervention in the second round may indicate the role of such
interventions in shaping behavior. We conjecture that individuals who have played the first
round of the game without intervention have gained information about how at least one indi-
vidual in their group behaves. This new information affects their posterior expectations. After
a second-round intervention, when they are able to successfully coordinate at the Pareto opti-
mal equilibrium, their expectations are again affected. However, their experience from the first
round, when their choices were not dictated, should still play a considerable role in forming
their expectations of how the subsequent round will be. Hence, intervening in the first round
provides a different initial starting point in individual expectations. When group behavior hap-
pens to be what the individual expected, this starting point is reinforced and the effect lasts
longer.
Our results suggest interesting implications insofar as coordination among the same group
of individuals is repeated. Our Ghanaian and Danish participants are able to coordinate better
when they start off on the right foot, i.e., when an intervention that instructs them to coordi-
nate better happens in the first round. This also true for our Spanish participants. However,
our Spanish participants are also able to coordinate better even when they do not start off on
the right foot, as long as an intervention happens. Starting on the right foot for the Spaniards,
however, means that better coordination lasts longer.
Bringing the point back to practical settings that initially motivated our research question,
our findings may provide a useful reflection or two for practical coordination challenges. First,
instructions and signals to encourage Pareto optimal coordination may be most successful at
the start of a new group coordination sequence, e.g. targeting parents at the start of a new
school year or targeting colleagues at the start of the year. Second, as coordination deteriorates
new interventions, like periodic reminders, may be successful in enhancing coordination in
some groups, as indeed common experience would suggest. Again, returning to our first
point, our results could indicate that subsequent interventions may benefit from a timing in
periods where some degree of expectations reset has occurred.
While our experimental design has something to say about coordination 1 to 3 rounds after
an exogenous positive coordination experience, it cannot really say anything about how coor-
dination would be in the very long run, i.e., 20 to 30 rounds after. How slow does coordination
decline after experience and how long will it take for coordination after experience to catch
up with coordination without experience? Will the effect of the experience be more positive
when the experience lasts for more than a round? What happens when there are intermittent
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experiences? These are questions that our current paper cannot answer, but are definitely
worth doing further research on.
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